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Costs: An Analysis of U.S. Electric Utility Rate
Changes 1980–2000
Adam R. Fremeth
University of Western Ontario
Guy L. F. Holburn*
University of Western Ontario
We argue that information asymmetries between regulators and ﬁrms increase
the administrative decision costs of initiating new policies due to the costs of
satisfying evidentiary or ‘‘burden of proof’’requirements. We further contendthat
regulators with better information about regulated ﬁrms—that is, with lower in-
formation asymmetries—have lower decision costs, thereby facilitating regula-
tor policy making. To empirically test our predictions, we examine the
relationshipbetweenregulatoryinformationalenvironmentsandchangestoreg-
ulated rates for all investor-owned electric utilities from 1980 to 2000. We exploit
several natural sources of variation in the informational environments of US state
utility regulators. These stem from the prior experiences and administrative
resources of regulators, observable policy decisions of other regulatory agen-
cies for a given utility, and differences in procedural regulations pertaining to
rate increases and decreases. Our results suggest that as regulators acquire
more information about utility operations, including from experience in ofﬁce,
they are more likely to enact rate decreases and less likely to implement rate
increases.
1. Introduction
Since Baron and Myerson (1982), an extensive theoretical, and mainly nor-
mative, literature has explored the impact of asymmetric information on
the design of optimal regulatory policies for natural monopolies (Laffont
and Tirole 1993; Armstrong and Sappington 2007). Although there is some
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policies implemented in various jurisdictions, speciﬁcally the adoption of
incentive-pricing mechanisms (Kridel et al. 1996; Ai and Sappington 2002),
therehas beenlittleanalysis ofthe impact ofinformation asymmetriesonpolicy
making from a positive theoretical perspective.
In this article,we adopt such a positive approach by arguing that asymmetric
information affects policy outcomes by increasing regulatory ‘‘decision costs.’’
Decision costs reﬂect the administrative resources utilized in the process of
makingregulatoryrulesandordersandarisefromlegalrequirementsthatagen-
cies follow due process in their decision making (Mashaw 1990; Tiller and
Spiller 1999; Stephenson 2007). A central requirement is that regulators con-
duct formal hearings and base their decisions on documented evidence pre-
sented therein. In the United States, utility regulators must specify ‘‘ﬁndings
of fact’’ after hearings which form the basis for establishing rates.
1 Obtaining
supportive evidence, however, can be a costly exercise for regulators who wish
to initiate new policies. In particular, we contend that the costs to the regulator
of collating evidence increase with the extent of information asymmetries that
exist between the regulator and the ﬁrm: regulators who are less well informed
about the ﬁrm, and thus about policy alternatives and consequences, ﬁnd it
more costly to justify a change in policy since it takes longer to collect data,
conduct analyses, and consult with other parties. Hence, information asymme-
tries, by raising the costs of regulator-initiated policy adjustments, tend to in-
sulate policies against regulator-induced change. On the other hand, lesser
informedregulatorsaremorelikelytoimplementpoliciesinitiatedbyregulated
ﬁrms who present evidence in favor of their proposal; obtaining counterevi-
dence to contest the ﬁrm’s claims and to support the status quo is again a costly
exercise for informationally disadvantaged regulators (Dal Bo 2006).
Here we conduct one of the ﬁrst empirical investigations of the relationship
between regulators information about regulated ﬁrms and their policy deci-
sions. Although directly observing the extent of regulatory information
presents a measurement challenge for researchers, we instead identify mech-
anisms through which information about regulated entities is revealed to ex-
ternal parties, including regulators. We focus our attention on three types of
mechanism: the ﬁrst considers the development of tacit knowledge through
a regulator’s prior experience in ofﬁce in the task of administering regulatory
policies;thesecondisthepublicationofcodiﬁedknowledgeaboutaﬁrm inthe
form of other agency, or judicial, rules or orders. Greater ﬁrst-hand regulatory
experience and greater amounts of external information both reduce the evi-
dentiary barriers to regulators implementing new policies, increasing their in-
cidence. Third, organized interest groups, such as consumers or NGOs
(Grossman and Helpman 2001; Kwoka 2002), can provide information that,
if credible, can establish the evidentiary basis for a policy decision.
1. In the absence of providing a rationale for their decisions, regulators would risk being over-
turned by the courts for making ‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ policy (Spulber and Besanko 1992;
Bawn 1997; Shipan 2000).
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rates in the US electric utility industry between 1980 and 2000. During this
period,stateregulatoryagenciesimplemented947rateincreasesand218rate
decreases through formal rate reviews. Consistent with our predictions, we
ﬁnd that regulatory agencies were more likely to implement rate reductions
and/or less likely to implement utility requests for rate increases, when (a)
agency commissioners had longer experience in ofﬁce, (b) agency staff were
relatively larger in number, and (c) other agencies had enacted similar rate
changes, or assessed operational penalties, for the same utility. These results
are consistent with improved informational ﬂows reducing the evidentiary
costs to regulators of implementing rate reductions and contesting utility rate
increase requests.
Ourargumentsandempiricalanalysisadditionallyprovidenew insightsinto
the extent to which regulatory policies tend to favor industry or organized in-
terest groups (Stigler 1971; Posner 1974; Becker 1976; Peltzman 1976). The
economic theory of regulation contends that organized interests can ‘‘capture’’
policy since regulators will exchange policy favors in return for politically
valuable resources such as electoral campaign contributions or votes. Our the-
oretical arguments here regarding regulatory decision costs imply that, over
time or with regulator experience, policy will automatically shift toward con-
sumer interests, independent of organized consumer attempts to inﬂuence pol-
icy decisions. As regulators gain more information about utilities through
experience in ofﬁce (e.g.), the decision costs of implementing rate reductions
or contesting utility requests for rate hikes decrease.
Nonetheless, utilities and organized interest groups may still exert a con-
certedinﬂuenceonpolicythroughvariousmeans,suchasbymakingcampaign
contributions to executive and legislative actors who oversee agency activities
(De Figueiredo and Edwards 2007) or by making promises of future private-
sectoremploymenttoagencyheads(Eckert1981;Spiller1990).Althoughdata
availability limitations prevent us from incorporating measures of such inﬂu-
ence strategies, we do include measures of interest group organization in our
investigation of utility rate making. Consistent with the interest group litera-
ture, our statistical results suggest that agencies are indeed sensitive to the bal-
ance of interest group pressures within the jurisdiction in their decisions to
increase utility rates, though much less so in their decisions to reduce rates.
We thus attempt tocontrol for interestgroup inﬂuences inour empirical design
when we assess the effect of regulatory commissioner experience and staff
resources.
In the next section, we discuss our central theoretical argument and thesis.
Following that, in Section 3 we develop speciﬁc hypotheses regarding the in-
formational conditions under which regulatory agencies are likely to imple-
ment changes to regulated rates in the utilities sector. In Sections 4 and 5,
we describe our empirical setting, methodology, and ﬁndings along with
alternative potential interpretations. Section 6 contains a broader discussion
of how our results contribute to existing literature, the limitations of our
approach, and opportunities for further research.
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In the canonical principal-agent formulation of regulatory policy making un-
der conditions of asymmetric information, regulatory institutional processes
are typically not modeled for purposes of parsimony. Institutional features
of the administrative process, such as conducting hearings for affected parties,
obtaining evidence, and documenting testimony, are not included in the scope
of such models. Similarly excluded are the explicit effects of political and ju-
dicial institutions on regulatory decisions.
2 In contrast to this institutional ab-
straction, a separate stream of political science research considers the rationale
for, and impact of, administrative procedures on regulatory decisions. Asym-
metric information exists not only between the regulatory agency and the util-
ity but also between elected political actors—who have ultimate responsibility
for regulatory policies—and regulatory agencies. Politicians may delegate
policy-making authority to agencies who develop private expertise on policy
alternatives and consequences, but this creates a control problem for the po-
litical principal: how to ensure that expert agencies implement the principal’s
preferred policy when the principal cannot easily know or specify that policy
ex ante (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
Scholars have argued that politicians are able to use administrative proce-
dures in addition to traditional oversight activities as strategic instruments to
ensure that bureaucratic agencies do not drift too far in their subsequent policy
making from the politicians ideal positions (McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989;
Balla 1998). For instance, statutory requirements that agencies provide public
noticeofintendedrulings,andthe opportunitytointerested partiestocomment
and participate in hearings, can reduce the informational disadvantage of po-
litical actors. By also requiring agencies to admit certain interest groups, such
as consumer advocates, into their proceedings, political coalitions can ‘‘stack
the deck’’ in favor of these groups without the need to continuously monitor
agency decisions ex post (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2006). The costs of
achieving agency compliance can thus be shifted from politicians toward
the agencies themselves, as well as organized interest groups and the courts,
though at the expense of limiting policy ﬂexibility and the ability to adapt to
future shocks (Holburn 2001).
Althoughalargebodyofliteraturehasexaminedtheconditionsunderwhich
legislatures, executives, and courts have incentives to shape agency decision-
making environments by implementing or enforcing procedural requirements
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1994, 1996; Bawn 1995, 1997; Huber and Shipan
2000), there has been remarkably little further theoretical development of
the precise mechanisms through which the various instruments actually affect
policy. For instance, enabling interest groups to participate in administrative
hearings isargued to send signals to politicians about which interestgroups are
organized and concerned about proposed policy changes, as well as to affect
the informational basis of agency decisions (McCubbins et al. 1987: 258),
though issues of information credibility and the potential for ‘‘cheap talk’’
2. For exceptions see Spiller (1990) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003).
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tests of the predicted policy impacts. In one study, Balla (1998) found no ev-
idence that physician participation in US Medicare reform processes during
1990 and 1991 affected ﬁnal policy decisions. Nor did Spence (1999) ﬁnd con-
vincing evidence that new statutory requirements signiﬁcantly altered federal
agencyhydroelectriclicensingoutcomes.Thesenullresultssupportlegalscholars
counterargument thatdueprocessprovides social, not political-strategic,value
in the context of societal preferences for procedural ‘‘fairness’’ (Mashaw
1990),thoughadditionalempiricalstudiesinotherindustrysettingsareneeded
to advance the debate.
Here we contribute to this stream of literature by focusing on the impact of
a single speciﬁc administrative procedure, the requirement that regulatory
agenciesbase theirpolicydecisions onavailableevidence. Atthefederallevel,
the US Administrative Procedure Act (APA) states the evidentiary require-
ment for agency decision making: ‘‘The proponent of a rule or order has
the burden of proof ...a rule or order [may not be] issued except on consid-
eration of the whole record ...and supported by and in accordance with re-
liable,probative, andsubstantialevidence’’(Title5,Pt1,Chapter5.II,556(d)).
Judicial precedent has established that an agency demonstrate that it has ‘‘ex-
amine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its
action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made’’(StateFarmv.MotorVehiclesManufacturersAssociation,463U.S.29
(1983)). Similar ‘‘hard look’’ provisions exist for state-level agencies. In
Maine, for example, ‘‘Every agency decision ...shall be in writing or stated
in the record, and shall include ﬁndings of fact sufﬁcient to apprise the parties
and any interested member of the public of the basis for the decision’’ (Maine
Code Chapter 5 section 9061).
We argue that evidentiary requirements create additional decision costs of
changing policies since obtaining sufﬁcient evidence and formulating argu-
ments take time and skill. Tiller and Spiller deﬁne decision costs as ‘‘the
amount of organizational resources req u i r e dt oc a l c u l a t et h el i k e l yp o l i c y
consequences of one’s own actions and ...the resources required to perform
the processes and procedures required to issue a decision’’ (1999: 351). In
general, then, the need to provide evidence creates a bias toward the status
quo or an ‘‘ossiﬁcation’’ of agency rulemaking as the expected beneﬁts of
a new policy may be outweighed by the costs of affecting the change, even
though courts may be selective in enforcing such standards (McGarity 1992;
Revesz 1997).
Decision costs, however, are likely to vary among regulatory agencies,
depending on the extent of information asymmetries between agencies and
regulated entities. Agencies differ in their knowledge and understanding of
the ﬁrms they regulate—that is, the degree of information asymmetry is
not a ﬁxed constant as commonly assumed in principal-agent models but
depends on factors such as staff experience and learning from prior monitoring
activities. Agencies may also vary in their willingness to invest in the acqui-
sition of expertise and information (Bawn 1995; Aghion and Tirole 1997;
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be an additional source of information for regulatory agencies though the de-
gree of organization varies by jurisdiction.
Well-informed agencies are better able to identify and assess the impact of
alternative policies on ﬁrms and external parties, and hence to collate support-
ing evidence for their decisions at relatively low cost. In the pharmaceutical
industry, for example, more experienced Food and Drug Administration reg-
ulators have a greater tendency to detect noncompliant manufacturing pro-
cesses during inspections, and hence to impose sanctions (Macher et al.
2009). Conversely, more poorly informed agencies will be less likely to iden-
tify ﬁrms that are out of compliance. If they do so, they will incur greater costs
of obtaining sufﬁcient evidence to justify a change in policy.
There are two implications for policy making: ﬁrst, all else equal, agencies
with better information will be more likely to initiate policy changes since the
costs of obtaining the necessary evidence to justify the change will be lower.
Less informed agencies will be less likely to initiate, bearing a greater eviden-
tiary cost. Without evidence, the agency would be at risk of being overturned
by the courts on procedural grounds. Courts have often deferred to regulatory
agencies on matters of substance though are more willing to overturn on pro-
cedural grounds (Studness 1992).
3 Section 706 of the APA enables federal
courts to ‘‘set aside agency actions, ﬁndings, and conclusions found to be ar-
bitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.’’
Second, moreexpertagencieswillbebetterpositioned toblockﬁrm-initiated
policy proposals. When regulated ﬁrms present evidence to support a new
policy—for example, the authorizationof a new pharmaceutical drug, new util-
ity rates, or a new technical standard—agencies with a deeper understanding of
theﬁrmsorindustrieswillbemoreabletoidentifybiasesintheirargumentsand
to assess the validity of their claims, thereby providing the grounds for denial.
Lessexpertagencies,ontheotherhand,willhaveahighercostofcounteringthe
evidentiary basis of such proposals, increasing the probability of acceptance.
In the next section, we develop this thesis in greater depth in the context of
changes to regulated rates in the utilities sector.
3. Hypotheses
In the United States, regulatory policies in the utilities sector are primarily
designed and implemented by state-level independent agencies, Public Utility
Commissions (PUCs). PUC mandates are broadly deﬁned: federal legal
3. In 1991, the US Supreme Court declined to review an earlier decision by both the Louisiana
Supreme Court and the Louisiana Public Service Commission supporting a US$1.4 billion disal-
lowance to the rate base of Gulf States Utilities. In that decision, the state court deferred to the
regulator and found that ‘‘Imprudence may be measured as the extent to which a utility fails to
achieve optimality in retrospect, not on the extent to which it failed to exercise reasonable judg-
ment’’ and that ‘‘commission orders are to be upheld unless they are arbitrarily or capriciously
rendered, or are not reasonably supported by the evidence’’ (Gulf States Utilities Co. v. LPSC,
578 So. 2d (La. 1991)).
6 The Journal of Law, Economics, & OrganizationprecedentestablishesthatPUCsmustsetratesthatenableutilitiestoearna‘‘fair
and reasonable’’ return on ‘‘used and useful’’ assets (Howe 1985; Lesser 2002),
though methodologies for assessing such criteria are not speciﬁed.
4 Procedural
requirements are more closely delineated, however, in state legislation. In
California, for instance,PUC ‘‘decision[s] shall contain,separately stated,ﬁnd-
ings of fact and conclusions of law by the commission on all issues material to
the order or decision’’ (Public UtilityCodesection 1705). Similar requirements
obtain in other states. Rates are determined through periodic rate reviews that
can be initiated at any point by the PUC or the utility. Upon initiation of a rate
review, a series of public hearings is held where the utility, PUC staff, and any
admittedinterestgroupspresentinformation,arguments,andevidencesupport-
ing their positions about justiﬁable allowed rates of return, operating costs, and
assets to be includedin the ratebase (Hyman 2000).
5 At the end of thisprocess,
which may extend up to a year or more in duration, PUC commissioners make
a majority decision on the rates that ﬁnal consumers are obliged to pay.
Depending on the commissioners assessment of the evidence presented, rates
may increase or decrease as compared to the status quo.
Utilities have anincentive toinitiateratereviews ifthey expect thatthe PUC
will establish the allowed rate of return at a level above the actual level the
utility is currently earning. Since rates are otherwise ﬁxed, the actual earned
rate of return on assets decreases asthe utility’s operating and investment costs
increase, all else equal. Historically, utilities have thus tended to initiate
reviews after periods when costs have risen, for instance after the construction
of new infrastructure facilities, operating cost increases, or after interest rate
rises (which affect ﬁnancing costs), in order to obtain higher rates and proﬁts
(Joskow 1974). PUCs, on the other hand, have an incentive to trigger rate
reviews if they consider actual earned proﬁts to be above the level determined
by the target allowed rate of return. In this case, a rate review would lead to
a reduction in rates and proﬁts for the utility.
Thetemporalpatternofratereviewsintheelectricutilitysectorduringthe
1980s and 1990s reﬂects, in part, the changing cost conditions of the indus-
try. During the 1980s, increasing investment in new generation capacity and
other assets, higher levels of inﬂation, and high interest rates all contributed
to substantial utility requests for rate increases (see Figure 1). In 1981, the
value of rate revenue increases across the industry peaked at $8 billion.
Conversely, lower investment levels in utility assets, low inﬂation levels,
and falling interest rates during the 1990s coincided with a substantial de-
crease in the amount of rate increases and an increase in the value of rate
reductions.
4. Precedent setting cases for this regulatory standard include Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466
(1898), FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), Jersey Central Power & Light v.
FERC, 810 F. 2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
5. Theratebaseisthevalueoftheutility’sassetsthatthePUCdeemsprudentlyincurredandon
which the utility is allowed to earn a ﬁnancial return. Changes in the rate base arise as the PUC
formally approves new investments that the ﬁrm has recently completed, for example, the com-
pletion of new electric generation capacity or the extension of transmission facilities.
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decisions of each party. For the PUC, it is difﬁcult to observe accurately the
utility’s earned rate of return at any point in time and hence whether a rate
reduction is justiﬁed. Better informed PUCs are more likely to identify,
and be able to document, whether a utility is overearning, and hence to im-
plement rate reductions. More astute PUCs are also better able to assess the
validity of any utility claims that they are underearning and that rate increases
are required. Anticipating greater levels of scrutiny and an increased proba-
bility of denial, utilities will be less likely to initiate reviews that call for rate
increases when PUCs have better information about the utility. In general,
then, we predict that conditions of reduced information asymmetries will
becorrelatedwithmoreratereductions andfewerrateincreases. Wenowiden-
tify several natural sources of information heterogeneity among regulators in
order to develop speciﬁc hypotheses about factors affecting the incidence of
utility rate increases and decreases.
3.1 Regulator Experience and Agency Resources
One source of information about utility costs, operations, and market condi-
tions is through regulators direct experience in the practice of regulation
(Macher et al. 2009). Experience enables individuals to ‘‘learn by doing’’
(Arrow 1962), and hence to improve their own and their organization’s per-
formance (Argote and Epple 1990). In regulated industries, Carpenter (2004)
argues that regulators develop more accurate information about ﬁrms through
repeated interactions over time. As regulatory commissioners and staff accu-
mulate more experience through monitoring and evaluation activities, they de-
velop deeper knowledge about speciﬁc regulated entities. A longer period of
experience in ofﬁce facilitates the greater accumulation of tacit knowledge.
Some of this knowledge exists tacitly within agency personnel. Other aspects
Figure 1. Value of Electric Utility Rate Increases and Decreases 1980–2000.
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lead to the development of organizational routines (Nelson and Winter 1982).
Agencies with relatively greater ﬁnancial resources are also able to devote
more resources to overseeing each regulated ﬁrm, thereby contributing to
the stock of organizational knowledge.
With greater experience in ofﬁce or agency resources, regulators become
more adept at understanding utility true costs, proﬁts, and managerial capa-
bilities,aswellastheimpactofexogenousevents—suchaschangesinweather
patterns, regional economic growth, environmental standards, or ﬁnancial
market conditions—on utility earnings, and hence whether utility proﬁts
are above or below the allowed rate of return. All else equal, then, regulators
withgreaterexperienceoragencyresourceswillbebetterabletoidentifywhen
rate reductions are justiﬁed and to provide the necessary evidence during a rate
review, and to contest utility requests for rate increases. Hence:
Hypothesis 1. Regulators with longer experience in ofﬁce or with greater
agency resources are (a) less likely to implement rate increases and (b) more
likely to implement rate decreases.
3.2 Information from Other Regulatory Agencies
Information on utility costs and operations can originate from sources other
than an agency’s own experience and oversight activities. For instance, cred-
ible information obtained and revealed by independent agencies in the course
of policy making can shape PUC beliefs about utility costs and management
prudence. State and federal agencies are generally subject to procedural
requirements that they document and disclose the evidentiary basis for their
decisions. In the electric utility sector, federal agencies such as the Nuclear
RegulatoryCommission(NRC)ortheEnvironmentalProtectionAgencymon-
itor selected aspects of utility performance and have the authority to punish
violations. The NRC, for example, can impose ﬁnancial penalties, ranging
from $75,000 for security breaches to $450,000 for technical violations requir-
ing a plant shutdown (Feinstein 1989). Similarly, for utilities that operate in
multiple states, other PUC rate determinations can also yield valuable infor-
mation about corporate management practices and abilities (Lyon and Mayo
2005). Both types of information, if credible, can assist PUCs in justifying rate
reductions or in countering utility claims that costs have risen and that rates
should be increased.
Hypothesis 2. External evidence from other agencies on higher (lower)util-
ity costs (a) increases the likelihood of a rate increase (decrease) and (b)
reduces the likelihood of a rate decrease (increase).
3.3 Interest Group Opposition
Organized interest groups also have an incentive to provide evidence to PUCs
on regulated ﬁrms and regulatory policy consequences (McCubbins et al.
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of information during regulatory decision-making procedures is one mecha-
nism by which interest groups can inﬂuence policy decisions since agencies
have a statutory duty to consider all available evidence (McCubbins et al.
1989). Agencies are typically prohibited from accepting ﬁnancial beneﬁts
from the parties they regulate (unlike elected politicians who may solicit cam-
paign contributions), so the provision of information during administrative
procedures is a central means by which opposing interest groups attempt to
shape regulatory policy.
State administrative procedure acts generally grant authority to major inter-
ested parties, such as large industrial consumers or consumer advocates, to
have standing in public rate hearings (De Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh
2004; Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2006). Standing provides interest groups
with the chance to access utility informational ﬁlings, to present arguments
and evidence regarding policy, and to challenge utility claims. In jurisdictions
with relatively well-organized interest groups, PUCs will have greater ﬂows of
information about utilities resulting from these groups monitoring activities.
We argue that interest group opposition has an asymmetric impact on the
direction of policy change. Speciﬁcally, we contend that organized interest
groups that oppose utilities are more effective at limiting the incidence of rate
increases than at promoting rate decreases. When a utility initiates a rate re-
view, it makes available to the PUC and interested parties the informational
basis of its claim for a rate increase, providing detailed evidence of increased
operating costsorassets.Organized interest groups thus gain access todetailed
utility information that they would not otherwise obtain outside the scope of
aratereview.Information asymmetriesare consequently substantiallyreduced
at the outset of a utility-initiated rate review. This documentation can provide
the basis for interest groups to more carefully scrutinize utility operations and
to contest utility arguments. The prospect of confronting organized interest
group opposition during rate hearings acts as a disincentive for utilities to re-
quest rate increases in adverse environments.
On the other hand, during periods when utilities do not initiate rate reviews,
the existence of informational asymmetries regarding utility costs makes it
difﬁcult for interest groups to independently obtain and provide evidence
of any cost decreases to a PUC that would justify a reduction in rates.
6 Interest
6. A vivid illustration of the challenge for interest groups, and indeed regulators, in identifying
utility cost reductions, or overearning, is provided by the case of Duke Energy in North Carolina
during 2002. According to a whistleblower, Barron Stone, a senior business analyst within the
accounting department at Duke, the ﬁrm had used illegal accounting practices to intentionally
underreport its regulated income by $124 million from 1998 to 2000. Duke had allegedly included
expenses from its unregulated retail operations in its regulated accounts and had additionally not
correctly reported $84 million of insurance rebates on its nuclear power plants. Such accounting
maneuvers enabled Duke to effectively boost its regulated proﬁts signiﬁcantly above the level
permitted by the North Carolina Utilities Commission. These remained undetected by the com-
missionfor almosta 3-year perioduntil alerted by an insider.See ‘‘DukeEnergy settles accounting
case with North Carolina Utilities Commission,’’ The Charlotte Observer, October 30, 2002.
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on a regular basis in the same ways that PUCs do. Collective action challenges
within diffuse groups—such as residential consumers—also hinder the ability
to organize and obtain the resources needed to effectively scrutinize utility
actions on a continuing basis. Imperfect information about utility operations
thus raises the costs for interest groups to credibly petition the PUC to initiate
a rate review with the purpose of ultimately reducing rates.
Hypothesis 3. Interest group opposition reduces the incidence of rate
increases but has a smaller effect on increasing the incidence of rate decreases.
3.4 Political Competition
Our ﬁnal hypothesis considers the political conditions under which agencies
have an incentive to expend effort in gaining additional expertise that reduces
information asymmetries regarding utilities. The credible threat of ex post po-
liticalsanctions—intheformofbudgetcuts,committeehearings,ornewlegis-
lation—can induce agency compliance (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Ex
anteproceduralcontrols,suchastheneedtojustifypolicydecisionswithdocu-
mented evidence, however, raise the costs of complying. As with interest
group opposition, the costs ofcomplying with political pressuresare asymmet-
ric across rate increases and rate decreases. Once a utility has ﬁled for a rate
increase and provided evidence, it is less costly for the PUC to challenge se-
lected aspects than to independently obtain evidence that would support a rate
decrease in the absence of a utility ﬁling. In political environments that are
hostile to utility policy positions, then, utilities would be less likely to request
a rate increase, anticipating the potential effect of political pressures on PUC
decisions. However, such pressures would be less effective in prompting the
PUC to initiate a rate review with the objective of reducing rates: even though
the PUC would beneﬁt politically, it would incur the administrative costs of
providing evidence that could withstand judicial review.
Research suggests that political pressures on regulatory policies can intensify
when competition between rival politicians or parties increases, making them
more willing to trade policy favors with interest groups for their votes and ﬁ-
nancial campaign contributions (Grier et al. 1994; Ansolabehere et al. 2003).
We anticipate that political party competition in the state legislature will tend to
beneﬁtconsumersratherthanutilitiessinceutilitiestendtodeveloppoliticalties
or connections with only a minority of legislators—utility headquarters and re-
gional ofﬁces are often concentrated in just a few political geographic districts.
Legislators in districts with a strong utility employment or corporate base will
thus be more likely to support utility interests in political and regulatory policy-
making arenas. However, utilities serve consumers distributed over multiple
political districts, if not statewide. In jurisdictions where a utility has less of
an employee or corporate presence but still serves consumers, legislators are
more likely to maximize their electoral chances by gaining the support of utility
consumers than utilities. These jurisdictions generally outnumber those where
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 11utility employment is concentrated, leading to a pro-consumer bias in the leg-
islature when utility regulatory policy is publicly salient.
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When the rivalry between competing political parties is strong, legislators
will be more likely to seek the support of voters by promoting pro-consumer
(i.e., voter) utility policies. In such environments, utilities—expecting adverse
political pressure to be exerted on PUCs—will be less likely to trigger rate
reviews. As argued above, the impact of political competition will be more
effective in limiting the incidence of utility requests for rate increases than
in actively promoting rate decreases. Hence:
Hypothesis 4. Political competition reduces the incidence of rate increases
but has a smaller effect on increasing the incidence of rate decreases.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
We compiled a panel data set of all PUC changes to rates for investor-owned
electric utilities covering 48 states between 1980 and 2000. In this time period,
there were 947 rate increases and 218 rate decreases across 190 utilities (see
Table1).Themajorityoftherateincreasesoccurredduringthe1980s,whereas
the majority ofratedecreases occurred during the 1990s.Weexcludedany rate
changes due to legislation accompanying electricity deregulation or market
restructuring. The unconditional annual probability of a rate increase was
24% and of a rate decrease was 5%. Thus, in any given year a utility would
generally not experience a rate change. Our primary data source for informa-
tion on rate reviews was Regulatory Research Associates, a private consulting
ﬁrm, which tracks regulatory policies in the utilities sector.
8
Our level of analysis is the utility-year. The potential panel of 3990 obser-
vations (190 utilities times 21 years) is reduced by 327 observations due to
utility merger and acquisition activity. An additional 21 observations were
dropped as we excluded the single utility operating in the District of Columbia
due to its anomalous political environment. Together these lead to a ﬁnal panel
of 3642 utility-year observations.
7. For instance, Xcel Energy, the major electric utility in Minnesota, supplies power to cus-
tomers in 109 of the state’s 134 electoral districts of the state-level House of Representatives.
However, the utility only maintains signiﬁcant operations in 13 of those districts (power plants
and ofﬁce buildings). Furthermore, only 3 of 13 Representatives in those districts where Xcel
is active sat on the House Energy Finance and Policy Committee in 2007–08. This committee
directly oversees the enactment and implementation of energy-related policy and the activities
of the Minnesota Public Utility Commission. In addition, none of these three Representatives
had held leadership positions, such as Chair or Vice-Chair.
8. Regulatory Research Associates reports all major rate reviews involving investor-owned
utilities. The data do not indicate which party initiated the rate review. We conﬁrmed the accuracy
of the data for a subsample of rate reviews using Moody’s Annual Public Utility Manual, Public
Utilities Fortnightly, and annual reports from the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners.
12 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization4.2 Empirical Model and Estimation Methodology
We model a PUC’s decision each year to increase, decrease, or leave un-
changed a utility’s rates using a multinomial logit speciﬁcation. This approach
is appropriate when the dependent variable is categorical rather than contin-
uous and does not have a natural rank ordering (Maddala 1983).
9
The multinomial logit estimates the probability of a PUC implementing
a rate decision of type j given by
Table 1. Electric Utility Rate Reviews 1980–2000
Year










1980 99 4345.5 30.6 1  15.1  15.1
1981 117 8041.5 30.2 0 0 0
1982 118 5869.4 25.05 0 0 0
1983 98 4243.4 23.4 2  22.6  11.3
1984 73 3198.6 23 7  166.5  10
1985 56 3562 22.65 4  24.6  5.15
1986 50 2428.8 16.9 15  227.8  5.8
1987 29 1472.3 15.3 28  673.4  15
1988 23 1472.7 25 16  467  14.25
1989 21 1288.3 21.8 11  124.1  9.3
1990 36 1494.7 13.4 7  154.5  29.7
1991 43 3184.3 33.1 4  85.4  19.85
1992 47 2158.8 22.2 5  72.3  4.5
1993 32 1408 26.35 8  152.5  13.3
1994 27 1041.6 17.9 13  280.3  12.7
1995 30 1094.6 19.3 9  825.3  40.9
1996 15 347.8 8.8 16  356.9  16
1997 7 86.3 6.8 16  576.1  31.7
1998 11 347.7 14.4 20  1096.1  26.15
1999 4 64.6 10.3 20  1649.2  14.8
2000 11 366.8 13.1 16  560.4  16.75
1980–2000 947 47,517.7 23.0 218  7530.1  15.0
1980–1990 720 37,417.2 24.2 91  1875.6  11.6
1991–2000 227 10,100.5 20.3 127  5654.5  17.4
Source: Regulatory Research Associates, 2001.
9. Apotentialalternativetothisestimatorwouldbeamodelthatconsiderstheorderednatureof
the dependent variable. However, tests of the proportional odds ruled against the use of an ordered
logitinthiscase(PetersonandHarrell1990;Agresti1990).Theproportionaloddsassumptiononly
holds if the independent variables effect on the cumulative odds does not change from one cu-
mulativeoddstothenextandthattheonlychangeistotheconstantterm.Asigniﬁcantresultonthe
chi-square test found that this assumption does not hold and that the dependent variable cannot be
treated as ordered. Nevertheless, for robustness we estimated the model using an ordered probit
and found the results quantitatively and statistically similar to those using the multinomial logit
estimator.


















forj ¼ 0; ð2Þ
where j represents the different discrete choices, with j ¼ 0 representing no
change to rates in that period, j ¼ 1 a decrease to rates, and j ¼ 2 an increase to
rates. Xj represents a vector of independent political, institutional, and eco-
nomic variables, and bj is the vector of estimated coefﬁcients speciﬁc to
the discrete choice j. Equation (2) represents the normalization of the most
common outcome, j ¼ 0, which acts as the comparison group so that coefﬁ-
cients can be compared to the decision to not change rates at all.
4.3 Independent Variables
4.3.1 Regulator Experience and Agency Resources. We created two varia-
bles to test the impact of experience and agency resources on PUC decisions.
Average Commissioner Tenure, which varies each year, is equal to the sum of
each commissioner’s tenure to date in years divided by the total number of
commissioners on the PUC. This provides a proxy for overall PUC commis-
sioner experience. The measure of agency resources, PUC Staff, is the number
of the commission’s professional and administrative staff per thousand state
population. Information on PUC commissioner names and stafﬁng was gath-
ered from annual volumes of the Book of the States, annual reports of the Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, and PUC Web sites.
4.3.2 Other Agency Information. We created several variables to assess
whether rulings by other administrative agencies affected PUC rate decisions.
First, since approximately 25% of utilities operate in multiple states we con-
structed two measures of rate decisions in other states. The rulings of other
commissions are publicly available legal documents and can provide valuable
information to a focal PUC on the operations of a particular utility. Other State
Rate Increases and Other State Rate Decreases are the cumulative dollar val-
ues of increases and decreases in a utility’s afﬁliated state operations, respec-
tively, overthe prior3years. Weassume thatlargerrate changes willgenerally
be supported by greater amounts of evidence. Second, in order to measure
management quality we use a novel data set from the NRC that records civil
penalties levied on utilities for noncompliant behavior. Using these data, pub-
lished annually as part of the NRC’s Annual Report, we generated NRC
Penalty which equals one in the year that a utility receives a penalty and the
2-year period afterwards (reﬂecting a reputational effect) and zero otherwise.
14 The Journal of Law, Economics, & OrganizationWeinteractedthisvariablewithadummyvariableforutilitieswithnucleargener-
atingcapacitytoidentifytheimpactofNRCpenaltiesspeciﬁcallyfortheseﬁrms.
4.3.3 Interest Group Opposition. Four variables capture different sources of
interest group competition that utilities may encounter in policy arenas. Con-
sumer Advocate is a dummy variable that indicates whether a state-funded
utility consumer advocate existed in a particular state-year. During the
1970s and 1980s, a number of states created consumer advocacy ofﬁces to
explicitly represent utility consumers before PUCs during rate reviews (Hol-
burn and Vanden Bergh 2006). Urbanization, measured as the urban percent-
age of the state population, also acts as a proxy for the level of residential
consumer lobbying. One might expect that the problems of collective action
are differentially overcome in more densely populated areas. Relatedly, Indus-
trial Sales, constructed using data from the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission, measures the proportion of the utility’s sales to industrial or
commercial consumers. This captures the dependence of the utility on larger
customers who are more likely to be mindful of energy costs and engaged in
the regulatory process. Finally, Sierra Club Membership is a count of the state
membership per capita in the Sierra Club, the largest environmental lobbying
organization in the United States. This variable captures the extent to which
state populations participate in environmental and other nongovernmental ac-
tivist organizations (Lyon and Kim 2006). Such groups have historically been
particularly active against utilities regarding the siting of new power genera-
tion plants and the environmental impact of existing facilities. Annual infor-
mationonstatemembershipwasprovided directlytousbytheSierra Club.We
expect that vigorous interest group opposition presents obstacles to potential
utility rate increases by providing evidence to support their case in rate hear-
ings, hence raising regulator decision costs of adopting a different position.
4.3.4 Political Rivalry. Two variables, Legislature Rivalry and Governor Ri-
valry, account for the degree of political competition within a state. For the
former, we construct the following statistic using data on party seats obtained
in the most recent state legislature election:
Legislature Rivalry
¼ 1  
ðMajority party seats in Legislature   Minority party seats in LegislatureÞ
Total seats in Legislature
:
WeconstructedasimilarvariableforGovernorRivalrybasedonthenumberof
votes cast for the winning and second placed candidates in the prior guberna-
torial election. Higher values on each of these measures (maximum value
equals one) reﬂect a slimmer overall majority by the dominant party.
10
10. Although swings in the degree of rivalry between political parties can be a slow-moving
process, states such as Alabama and South Carolina moved from unanimous Democrat controlled
legislatures in the 1980s to almost a 50/50 split between parties by the mid 1990s.
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 154.3.5 Controls. We include a number of other variables that could motivate
the PUC or utility to initiate a rate review. Consistent with the interest group
hypothesis, we incorporate a measure of a utility’s political strength within
a state, Utility’s Share of Total Electricity Sales within State. Using data
on electricity sales in megawatt hours from the Energy Information Admin-
istration, this variable measures the percentage of a state’s electricity that is
sold by the focal utility. We propose that more dominant utilities, reﬂecting
a more concentrated utility sector, will be better able to organize against op-
posing interest groups and to lobby in political and regulatory arenas for favor-
able policy decisions.
Autility’scost ofcapitalisacentral component inthe PUC’s calculations of
an appropriate allowed rate of return. Change in Interest Rate measures the
percentage point difference between the interest rate on the US 10-year Trea-
sury Bill for a particular year minus the interest rate at the time of the last rate
review for the utility.
11 Similarly, we include a measure of the change in the
utility’s fuel cost which represents a major input in the generation of electric-
ity. Change in Fuel Cost represents the percentage change in a utility’s annual
dollar expenditures on fuel since its last rate review. Utility-level fuel cost data
areavailablefrom annualForm 1disclosureﬁlingsmadetotheFederalEnergy
Regulatory Commission. The total annual dollar amount spent by a utility on
fuel was also included as a separate variable, Fuel Cost; utilities with higher
fuel costs may face differential pressures to moderate rate increases. Utilities
also tend to seek rate increases after making large-scale investments, such as
the construction or acquisition of new generating units. Change in Net Utility
Plant measures the percentage change in the book value of assets since the last
rate review. However, since utility investment may be endogenous to our
model (causally correlated with included regressors or the error term), we
substituted Change in Net Utility Plant with an instrumental variable in
one of our speciﬁcations.
12
Weincludeafurthersetofmeasuresthatconsiderraterulingsthathavebeen
made for other utilities that operate within a focal state. Other Utility Rate
Increases and Other Utility Rate Decreases are measured as the dollar value
of rate increases and decreases, respectively, from rate reviews over the last 3
years for utilities in the same state other than the focal utility. Commissions
11. To avoid losing observations when constructing this variable, we collected data on the
utility’s last rate review before 1980 and used the Treasury Bill rate at that time when calculating
thismeasure.Weappliedthe sameapproachin calculatingChangeinFuelCost andChangein Net
Utility Plant.
12. We applied a two-stage least squares instrumental variable approach to control for the po-
tential endogeneity bias that may result from including the Change in Net Utility Plant variable in
our model. As changes to both regulated rates and a utility’s asset base may be jointly determined
by factors outside our model, such as the growth in demand for electricity, we used the 5-year state
population growth rate as an instrument. In the ﬁrst-stage regression, the estimated coefﬁcient on
this variable was signed positively, as expected, and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The F
statistic testing the hypothesis that coefﬁcients on the instrument are jointly zero was very high
(128.63), suggesting that the instrument is valid.
16 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationmay accrue new knowledge from the rate reviews of other utilities and apply
thisinformation concerningcostsordemandtothecaseofautilityoperatingin
the same institutional environment.
State electricity market or corporate utility restructuring may also be cor-
related with the incidence of rate changes. Legislatures have frequently frozen
retail rates as part of deregulation laws, limiting (though not completely elim-
inating) the ability of utilities to initiate rate reviews. We thus include Dereg-
ulation as a dummy variable equal to one in years when a state has enacted
wholesale or retail electricity market deregulation reforms. Another dummy
variable, Merger and Acquisition, is equal to one in years that a utility under-
took corporate restructuring through mergeror acquisition with another utility.
We control for both ﬁrm- and state-speciﬁc (and time-invariant) character-
istics by including a series of dummy variables in our speciﬁcations.
13 Sim-
ilarly, we include a dummy variable, 1990s Decade, which is equal to one for
observationsfrom1990to2000tocapturethetemporaltrenddifferencesinthe
incidence of rate increases and decreases as noted above between the 1980s
and 1990s.
Descriptive statistics and sources for all variables are presented in Table 2.
5. Results
5.1 Electric Utility Rate Changes
We present multinomial logit model coefﬁcient estimates and robust standard
errors in Table 3. Model 1 includes the full set of independent and control
variables. Model 2 differs only with the substitution of the instrumental vari-
able forChange inNet Utility Plant. Each model has apseudo R-squaredvalue
of approximately 0.27, implying that the speciﬁcations provide a relatively
good explanatory ﬁt to the data. We focus our discussion below on the coef-
ﬁcients estimated in Model 2 given our theoretical preference for the instru-
mental variable. We note, however, that the pattern of statistical signiﬁcance
on the coefﬁcient estimates is very similar across the two models.
One potential concern in panel data is the existence of serial correlation
between the error terms which leads to underestimation of standard errors.
Following the approach of Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003), we imple-
mentedaWaldtestoneachmodel;nonsigniﬁcantFstatisticsstronglysuggested
that the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated. A Hausman-McFadden
test also rejected the alternative hypothesis of dependence between alternative
choices which would generate biased coefﬁcient estimates in multinomial
models (Hausman and McFadden 1984).
Whereas standard errors can identify variables of statistical signiﬁcance, we
calculate marginal effects estimated for Model 2 (reported in Table 4) which
quantify the magnitude of the impact on the predicted probability of rate
13. By including state ﬁxed effects, we are unable to include state-level variables that do not
change over time in our sample time period.
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 17Table 2. Variable Descriptions, Sources and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Average Commissioner Tenure
a Average years of experience in ofﬁce of state PUC
commissioners
3.906 2.798 0 21.333
PUC Staff
a Full-time employees at the PUC per thousand state capita 0.039 0.044 0.003 0.338
Other State Rate Increase
b Value of rate increases allowed to afﬁliated utilities in other
states in the past 3 years ($ millions)
24.274 81.757 0 784
Other State Rate Decrease
b Value of rate decreases allowed to afﬁliated utilities in other
states in the past 3 years ($ millions)
5.643 33.084 0 360.7
Nuclear Generator
c Dummy variable ¼ 1 if the utility has nuclear generation
capacity
0.416 0.493 0 1
NRC Penalty   Nuclear
d Dummy variable ¼1 if a utility had been levied a civil penalty in
excess of $50,000 in the past 3 years from the NRC and had
nuclear generating capacity
0.146 0.353 0 1
Utility Share of Total Electricity
Sales within State
e
Percentage of the state’s total electricity (in megawatt hours)
sold by a utility
0.270 0.255 0.003 1
Consumer Advocate
f Dummy variable ¼ 1 if state has a legislated consumer
advocate
0.600 0.489 0 1
Industrial Sales
c Electricutilitysalestoindustrialandcommercialconsumersas
a percentage of total utility revenue
0.639 0.080 0.399 0.902
Sierra Club Membership
g State membership of the Sierra Club per thousand capita 1.596 1.092 0.285 8.477
Urbanization
h Percentage of state population in urban centers 0.697 0.139 0.322 0.944
Legislature Party Competition
a One minus percentage of seat majority of dominant party in
state legislature in last election
0.718 0.229 0.057 1
Governor Competition
a One minus percentage margin of victory by state governor in
last election
0.837 0.135 0.338 0.999
Change in Interest Rate
h Percentage point change in interest rate on the US 10-year
Treasury Bill since the utility’s last rate review











































Variable Description Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Change in Fuel Cost
c Percentage change in the utility’s total fuel cost since the last
rate review
0.313 9.552  1.003 573.79
Change in Net Utility Plant
c Percentage change in the book value of a utility’s net plant
assets since its last rate review
0.169 0.544  0.877 17.347
Fuel Cost
c Value of electric utility fuel cost ($100 million) 2.336 2.604 0 23.249
Election Year
a Dummy variable ¼ 1 in years of state legislature or
gubernatorial elections
0.474 0.499 0 1
Deregulation
i Dummy variable ¼ 1 in years of electricity market
deregulation
0.023 0.148 0 1
Merger and Acquisition
c Dummy variable ¼ 1 in years that utility engaged in either
corporate merger or acquisition
0.049 0.217 0 1
Other Utility Rate Increase
b Value of rate increases allowed to other utilities in the same
state over the past 3 years ($ millions)
172.784 295.02 0 1845.6
Other Utility Rate Decrease
b Value of rate decreases allowed to other utilities in the same
state over the past 3 years ($ millions)
20.065 58.035 0 716.8
1990s Decade Dummy variable ¼ 1 in years 1990–2000 0.514 0.499 0 1
aBook of the States, various years.
bRegulatory Research Associates rate case report (2001) and the NARUC Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation, various years.
cFERC Form 1 database and Financial Statistics of Selected Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, various years.
dAnnual Report of the NRC, various years.
eEnergy Information Administration Form EIA-861.
fHolburn and Vanden Bergh (2006).
gSierra Club National Headquarters.
hBureau of Economic Analysis.


















































9Table 3. Multinomial Logit Model of Electric Utility Rate Changes, 1980–2000
DV ¼ rate change (j ¼ 0, 1, 2)









Average Commissioner Tenure (Hypothesis 1)  0.0545** (0.0279) 0.1247*** (0.0488)  0.0494** (0.0276) 0.1216*** (0.0486)
PUC Staff (Hypothesis 1) 2.4651 (2.7967) 5.2013* (3.1781) 3.3425 (2.9233) 5.8595** (3.2256)
NRC Penalty   Nuclear (Hypothesis 2)  0.3263** (0.1931) 0.5776 (0.3785)  0.3229** (0.1927) 0.5388 (0.3766)
Nuclear Generator (Hypothesis 2)  0.1368 (0.2367)  0.1409 (0.4445)  0.2686 (0.2296)  0.1595 (0.4586)
Other State Rate Increase (Hypothesis 2) 0.0026*** (0.0007)  0.0024 (0.0025) 0.0024*** (0.0007)  0.0025 (0.0024)
Other State Rate Decrease (Hypothesis 2)  0.0020 (0.0059) 0.0054** (0.0028)  0.0030 (0.0061) 0.0049** (0.0027)
Utility Share of Total Electricity Sales within State 1.5804 (1.7912) 5.4689 (7.5023) 3.7605** (2.0017) 7.7639 (6.8942)
Consumer Advocate (Hypothesis 3)  0.7100*** (0.2863) 1.2667 (0.8131)  0.6149** (0.2851) 1.2175 (0.8036)
Sierra Club Membership (Hypothesis 3)  0.2971** (0.1664) 0.1799 (0.2200)  0.3250** (0.1746) 0.1714 (0.2209)
Urbanization (Hypothesis 3)  0.3637 (4.4998) 9.5943 (7.4446)  0.8435 (4.4139) 9.2248 (7.3384)
Industrial Sales (Hypothesis 3)  8.5266*** (2.6000) 10.8962** (5.8319)  8.2267*** (2.5872) 10.7493** (5.7784)
Legislature Party Competition (Hypothesis 4)  2.2476*** (0.4704) 1.5530 (1.0377)  2.0723*** (0.4618) 1.5728 (1.0232)
Governor Competition (Hypothesis 4)  0.0767 (0.3851) 0.7290 (0.7677) 0.0204 (0.3801) 0.8093 (0.7783)
Change in Interest Rate 0.1218*** (0.0250)  0.3347*** (0.0668) 0.1092*** (0.0254)  0.3468*** (0.0665)
Change in Fuel Cost 0.0069** (0.0041)  0.3925** (0.2171) 0.0559 (0.0623)  0.3333* (0.2061)
Change in Net Utility Plant 0.8321*** (0.2712) 0.8033 (0.5679) 3.0566*** (0.8199) 1.9006 (1.4934)
Deregulation  1.4566** (0.7671) 0.9341** (0.4186)  1.5367** (0.7690) 0.9353** (0.4140)
Election Year 0.0534 (0.0945) 0.0952 (0.1675) 0.0581 (0.0944) 0.0994 (0.1673)
Merger and Acquisition  0.3799 (0.3135)  0.0167 (0.3700)  0.4313 (0.3078)  0.0225 (0.3691)
Other Utility Rate Increase 0.0016*** (0.0003)  0.0015** (0.0007) 0.0016*** (0.0003)  0.0015** (0.0007)
Other Utility Rate Decrease  0.0042** (0.0019) 0.0047*** (0.0016)  0.0049*** (0.0020) 0.0045*** (0.0016)
Fuel Cost  0.1173** (0.0524)  0.0801 (0.1298)  0.0898** (0.0517)  0.0577 (0.1230)











































DV ¼ rate change (j ¼ 0, 1, 2)









Constant 4.9786 (3.4849)  49.8284*** (8.0394) 7.2104** (4.3291)  24.4750*** (8.0683)
State ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Utility ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Observations 3642 3642
Pseudo R-squared 0.269 0.265
Log likelihood  2020.945  2030.642


















































1increases or decreases. Marginal effects have been calculated at the means of
continuous variables and at zero for discrete variables.
Beginning with the main variables of interest, we ﬁnd strong support for our
ﬁrst hypothesis regarding the impact of regulatory resources on rate decisions.
The coefﬁcients on Average Commissioner Tenure are signed as expected and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or less for the rate decrease and rate
increase components of the multinomial logit.
14 The magnitudes of the effects
are not trivial: increasing the value of this variable by one standard deviation
from its mean decreases the probability of a rate increase in any year by 2.3%
and increases the probability of a rate decrease by 1.9%. Raising similarly the
number of PUC Staff relative to the state population is also estimated to in-
crease the likelihood of a rate decrease by 1.2% (the coefﬁcient on the rate
increase component is not statistically signiﬁcant). Greater regulatory agency
experience and ﬁnancial resources thus appear to exert downward pressure on
utility rates, consistent with our argument that these factors reduce agency de-
cision and evidentiary costs.
Theresultsalsoprovide supportfor thehypothesized impactofotheragency
decisions (Hypothesis 2): the estimated coefﬁcients on Other State Rate
Increases and Other State Rate Decreases are statistically signiﬁcant for, re-
spectively, the increase and decrease components of the multinomial logit
model. That is, the value of prior recent rate changes in other jurisdictions
is correlated with similar rate changes in the focal state. A standard deviation
increase in each of these variables raises the probability of a similar rate
change in any year by approximately 3.1% and 1.2%, respectively. Some cau-
tion is warranted here, however, in our interpretation of this result since we do
Table 4. Estimated Change in Predicted Probability of Rate Increase or Rate Decrease
Independent variables
DPr (Rate increase) DPr (Rate decrease)
Mean þ 1SD
Minimum to





 0.023  0.160 0.019 0.172
PUC Staff ns 0.012 0.092
NRC Penalty   Nuclear dummy na  0.051 na na
Other State Rate Increase 0.031 0.318 ns
Other State Rate Decrease ns 0.012 0.126
Utility Share of Total Electricity
Sales within State
0.101 0.311 ns
Consumer Advocate na  0.102 na na
Sierra Club Membership  0.049  0.271 ns
Industrial Sales  0.092  0.544 0.059 0.289
Legislature Party Competition  0.066  0.306 ns
Change in Interest Rate 0.048 0.300  0.037  0.268
Change in Net Utility Plant 0.053 0.402 ns
ns, nonsigniﬁcant; na, not applicable.
14. We use one-tailed tests since these are appropriate for one-sided hypotheses.
22 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationnot observe the underlying mechanism. One interpretation may be that other
PUC rate rulings provide political legitimacy, or credibility, to the PUC in its
own decisions, thereby facilitating similar rate changes. We leave exploration
of this alternative hypothesis for future work.
A history of NRC penalties is also found to affect PUC rate decisions by
decreasing the likelihood of a rate increase for utilities with nuclear capacity,
though there is no statistically signiﬁcant effect on the probability of a rate
decrease.
Consistent with our expectations regarding the asymmetric impact of in-
terest group opposition on utility rate changes (Hypothesis 3), we ﬁnd that
organized consumer and environmental groups tend to limit the incidence
of rate increases but generally do not increase the incidence of rate decreases.
The coefﬁcient estimates for Consumer Advocate and Sierra Club Member-
ship are negatively signed and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for rate
increases but are not signiﬁcant for rate decreases. Again, the estimated mag-
nitude of the impact is not small: the likelihood of a PUC awarding a rate
increase to a utility is reduced by 10.2% in a state with an independent utility
consumer advocacy ofﬁce. Increasing Sierra Club Membership by one stan-
dard deviation from its mean is associated with a 4.9% reduction in the prob-
ability of a rate increase. Industrial consumers, however, appear to be tougher
opponents for utilities. Utilities that sell a greater proportion of their output to
industry witness fewer rate increases and more rate decreases (the coefﬁcient
estimates for Industrial Sales are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 1% lev-
els for both the rate increase and decrease components of the multinomial
logit). Increasing the value of Industrial Sales by one standard deviation from
its mean increases the chance of a rate decrease by 5.9% and reduces the
chance of a rate increase by 9.2%. The substantial and symmetric impact
of industry on rate changes may be explained by their relative energy intensity
as well as by their greater access to ﬁnancial resources—which facilitate
greater levels of organization, monitoring of utility costs, and regulatory hear-
ing participation.
Our results suggest as well that, in addition to interest group competition,
PUC rate decisions respond to political pressures (Hypothesis 4). One such
source is the state legislature: the coefﬁcient on Legislature Rivalry is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for rate increases. The impact of
political party competition within the state senate and house on the incidence
of utility rate increases is quite substantial. A one standard deviation increase
in the value of our measure of political competition from its mean reduces the
annual likelihood of a rate increase by 6.6%. State legislators thus appear to
weigh consumer rather than utility interests more heavily in competitive po-
litical environments. As with interest group competition, we ﬁnd too that the
effect of political competition is asymmetric across rate increases and
decreases: the coefﬁcient on Legislature Rivalry is statistically insigniﬁcant
for rate decreases. By contrast, we do not ﬁnd that party competition for
the state governor’s ofﬁce inﬂuences PUC decisions to change utility rates
(the coefﬁcient estimates on Governor Rivalry are not statistically signiﬁcant).
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 23Finally, we note that many of the control variables have correctly signed
coefﬁcients and are statistically signiﬁcant, giving us greater conﬁdence in
our speciﬁcation. The estimated coefﬁcients on Change in Interest Rate are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level for both the rate increase and decrease
equations and are signed as expected. Increasing the change in interest rate
since the last rate review by one standard deviation from the sample mean
value increases the likelihood of a rate increase by 4.8% and reduces the likeli-
hood of a rate decrease by 3.7%. Increases in the value of a utility’s assets are
also associated with more frequent rate increases, though there is no assessed
impactonthefrequencyofratedecreases.Similarly,utilitiesthatholdagreater
share of total state sales of electricity are much more likely to experience a rate
increase (statistically signiﬁcant at 5%).
Periods of deregulation are associated with fewer rate increases and more
rate decreases, perhaps reﬂecting broader political motivations to reduce elec-
tricity costs through legislated or regulatory mechanisms. Interestingly,
changes in fuel costs and corporate mergers and acquisitions are not correlated
empirically with changes to rates. This may be due to the implementation of
automatic fuel adjustment clauses in many states that enable rates to change
outside the scope ofnormal ratereviews. Corporate restructuring hasgenerally
occurredonlyrecently,coincidentwithderegulationandlegislatedratefreezes
inanumber of states.Ratechangesacrossutilitieswithin the samestate tend to
be highly correlated (the coefﬁcients on Other Utility Rate Increases and
Decreases are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% or 1% levels), however, pos-
sibly reﬂecting the inﬂuence of common economic and political conditions
within a particular state-level jurisdiction.
5.2 Alternative Interpretations of Empirical Results
A shortcoming of our research design, which limits our ability to draw ﬁrmer
conclusions, is that we do not directly observe the state of regulatory infor-
mation asymmetries or of agency decision costs. This leaves open the possi-
bility of alternative explanations for the underlying cause of the observed
statistical correlation between commissioner experience and regulated rate
changes. One competing alternative is that with longer time in ofﬁce, regula-
tory commissioners become more susceptible to organized capture by con-
sumer groups (Peltzman 1976). We are able to test this alternative
interpretation by introducing interaction terms into our empirical model. In
Table 5, we report two models which include, separately, an interaction be-
tween Average Commissioner Tenure and Industrial Sales and between Aver-
age Commissioner Tenure and Utility’s Share of Total Electricity Sales within
State.
Under the consumer capture hypothesis, we would expect a greater impact
of increasing Industrial Sales on the probability of rate decreases as Average
CommissionerTenureincreases(andalowerimpactontheprobabilityofarate
increase): more organized industrial consumers should be better able to
achieve favorable rate changes the longer that PUC commissioners have been
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DV ¼ rate change (j ¼ 0, 1, 2)









Commission Tenure   Industrial Sales 0.3358 (0.3579)  1.0606 (0.6663)
Commission Tenure   Utility Sales  0.0194 (0.1118) 0.1424 (0.2094)
Average Commissioner Tenure (Hypothesis 1)  0.2638 (0.2293) 0.7992** (0.4305)  0.0429 (0.0447) 0.0705 (0.0848)
PUC Staff (Hypothesis 1) 3.4339 (2.8962) 5.6368** (3.2922) 3.3248 (2.9302) 5.9516** (3.2173)
NRC Penalty   Nuclear (Hypothesis 2)  0.3291** (0.1930) 0.5572 (0.3809)  0.3205** (0.1933) 0.5523 (0.3781)
Nuclear Generator (Hypothesis 2)  0.2745 (0.2297)  0.1232 (0.4663)  0.2655 (0.2311)  0.1603 (0.4563)
Other State Rate Increase (Hypothesis 2) 0.0024*** (0.0007)  0.0029 (0.0026) 0.0024*** (0.0007)  0.0026 (0.0025)
Other State Rate Decrease (Hypothesis 2)  0.0031 (0.0061) 0.0049** (0.0027)  0.0030 (0.0061) 0.0049** (0.0027)
Utility Share of Total Electricity
Sales within State
3.8122** (1.9966) 7.6976 (6.8505) 3.8468** (2.0773) 6.9619 (7.0306)
Consumer Advocate (Hypothesis 3)  0.6104** (0.2851) 1.1721 (0.8116)  0.6151** (0.2851) 1.2211 (0.8063)
Sierra Club Membership (Hypothesis 3)  0.3131** (0.1751) 0.1606 (0.2197)  0.3242** (0.1745) 0.1819 (0.2235)
Urbanization (Hypothesis 3)  0.9830 (4.4086) 9.3536 (7.3061)  0.7956 (4.4138) 9.3126 (7.3337)
Industrial Sales (Hypothesis 3)  9.2571*** (2.8214) 14.7901*** (6.2199)  8.2256*** (2.5857) 10.8897** (5.7791)
Legislature Party Competition (Hypothesis 4)  2.0508*** (0.4623) 1.4276 (1.0397)  2.0768*** (0.4622) 1.6207 (1.0296)
Governor Competition (Hypothesis 4) 0.0285 (0.3798) 0.7342 (0.7811) 0.0208 (0.3803) 0.8303 (0.7795)
Change in Interest Rate 0.1088*** (0.0254)  0.3500*** (0.0666) 0.1095*** (0.0255)  0.3488*** (0.0668)
Change in Fuel Cost 0.0568 (0.0628)  0.3333* (0.2047) 0.0560 (0.0624)  0.3386* (0.2061)
Change in Net Utility Plant 3.0879*** (0.8199) 1.6257 (1.5030) 3.0488*** (0.8197) 1.9592 (1.5120)
Deregulation  1.5327** (0.7701) 0.9259** (0.4202)  1.5343** (0.7690) 0.9341** (0.4127)
Election Year 0.0587 (0.0944) 0.1047 (0.1670) 0.0575 (0.0946) 0.1014 (0.1675)
Merger and Acquisition  0.4315 (0.3067)  0.0183 (0.3658)  0.4300 (0.3078)  0.0260 (0.3675)




















































DV ¼ rate change (j ¼ 0, 1, 2)









Other Utility Rate Decrease  0.0050*** (0.0021) 0.0043*** (0.0016)  0.0049*** (0.0020) 0.0045*** (0.0016)
Fuel Cost  0.0922** (0.0518)  0.0602 (0.1198)  0.0895** (0.0517)  0.0617 (0.1242)
1990s Decade  0.5742*** (0.1562)  0.8440*** (0.2709)  0.5633*** (0.1549)  0.8740*** (0.2717)
Constant 7.9233** (4.3997)  26.9076*** (8.1899) 2.4755 (3.4778)  52.026*** (6.3914)
State ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Utility ﬁxed effects Yes Yes
Observations 3642 3642
Pseudo R-squared 0.266 0.266
Log likelihood  2029.08  2030.39









































nin ofﬁce. The inverse of this relationship would be expected when including
the Utility’s Share of Total Electricity Sales within State in the interaction with
Average Commissioner Tenure, which would be consistent with Stigler’s reg-
ulated utility capture hypothesis.
Interpreting the coefﬁcients of interaction variables in nonlinear models,
such as the multinomial logit, presents particular challenges. Ai and Norton
(2003) have illustrated how neither the sign of the coefﬁcient nor the standard
errors of the estimate can provide direct information about the direction of the
effect or its statistical signiﬁcance. As a result, we rely on a stochastic sim-
ulation technique that allows us to identify the conditional effect of an inter-
action termbyfocusingonchangestopredicted probabilities(Kingetal.2000;
Zelner 2009).
15 In addition, this approach provides conﬁdence intervals that
identify statistical signiﬁcance at varying ranges of the explanatory variables.
In order to facilitate interpretation of the coefﬁcients, we illustrate the
effects graphically in Figures 2 and 3 by estimating the changes to the pre-
dicted probability that a PUC implements a rate increase or decrease. The
x axis depicts the range of the data for the measure of either Industrial Sales
(Figure 2) or Utility’s Share of Total Electricity Sales within State (Figure 3).
The y axis presents the percentage change in probability that a PUC imple-
ments a rate increase (decrease) when the Average Commissioner Tenure vari-
able increases by one standard deviation from its mean.
16 Statistical
signiﬁcance is represented by the bars that identify 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The effect is signiﬁcant at the 5% level where the bars do not cross zero (rep-
resented by a horizontal line).
In Figure 2, we observe a negative slope in the ﬁrst panel which demon-
strates that as industrial sales increase (representing stronger consumer pres-
sure on the agency), the impact of increasing commissioner experience on the
likelihood of a rate reduction decreases. This negative correlation is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at low to mid value ranges of the Industrial Sales variable.
15. This approach uses Monte Carlo simulation to provide a more precise depiction of the
probability distribution by using the parameter estimates and variance-covariance matrix of the
model to make 1000 random draws of estimates from a multivariate normal distribution. The sim-
ulateddistributionisthenusedto estimatethepredictedprobabilityofa rateincreaseordecreaseat
speciﬁed values of the covariates. Changes to predicted probabilities are then easily computed by
ﬁnding the difference in predicted probabilities as discrete changes are made to these covariates.
The logic of this procedure is analogous to a survey-based approach that is able to improve the
accuracy of its estimate of a population by increasing sample size. However, in this case the focus
isontheprobabilitydistribution,whichwhenproperlyaccountedforinnonlinearmodelsimproves
statistical interpretation. This approach to the interpretation is preferable to the analytical delta
method which is technically demanding and can lead to biased results if the Taylor series is
not approximated beyond the second order (King et al. 2000). For other empirical analyses that
have adopted this technique, see Balla (2000), Krause and Bowman (2005), Epstein et al. (2006),
and Holburn and Zelner (2010).
16. This is the difference in the probability that a PUC implements a rate increase (decrease)
when the AverageCommissioner Tenurevariableis set one standarddeviationaboveits mean (x ¼
6.704)fromtheprobabilitywhentheAverageCommissionerTenurevariableis setatitsmean(x¼
3.906).
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 27This pattern is not consistent with the consumer capture hypothesis, which
would be supported by a positive slope: we would expect more experienced
commissioners to be more ‘‘captured’’ when industrial consumers are stronger
and hence to increase their incidence of rate reductions. Instead, our interpre-
tation is that commissioner experience and industrial consumer monitoring of
the utility each provides partially substitutable informational beneﬁts to the
regulatory agency: as either one increases, thereby improving agency informa-
tion about utility earnings, the marginal beneﬁt of the other decreases. In other
Figure 2. Interaction between Average Commissioner Tenure and Industrial Sales.
28 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationwords, the beneﬁts (e.g., identifying situations when a rate reduction is justi-
ﬁed) of a highly organized industrial consumer advocacy group to a very ex-
perienced regulatory commission are less than to a newly appointed
commission that has much to learn about the utilities it regulates. We note
Figure 3. Interaction between Average Commissioner Tenure and Utility Share of Total
Electricity Sales within State.
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 29that the interaction results are statistically insigniﬁcant at all values of the In-
dustrial Sales variable in the rate increase panel at the bottom of Figure 2.
In Figure 3, we apply a similar interpretation to the positive correlation in
the upper panel between utility dominance and commissioner experience,
which is statistically signiﬁcant in the mid range of values of Utility’s Share
of Total Electricity Sales within State. When utilities have a more dominant
market position, commissioner experience becomes more important in enact-
ing rate reductions (the interactions are again insigniﬁcant for rate increases).
One interpretation is that informational asymmetries are greater for relatively
large utilities, or in states where there are fewer benchmark comparisons to be
made among multiple utilities. In these types of environments, commissioner
experience is more valuable in identifying when utilities are overearning, and
hence when rate reductions may be required.
The inclusion of interaction terms in our analysis thus does not provide ev-
idence suggesting that consumer capture is driving the tendency for more ex-
perienced commissioners to adopt more pro-consumer policies. Nonetheless,
we recognize that further investigation and analyses are required to more
comprehensively explore our ﬁndings.
6. Discussion
In this article we argue that due to legal burden of proof requirements govern-
ing regulatory decision making, information asymmetries between regulators
and ﬁrms increase the cost to the regulator of initiating new policies or of
defending existing policies against ﬁrm-initiated proposals. When regulators
are less knowledgeable about the ﬁrms they regulate, they incur greater costs
of collecting and assessing information, constructing logical arguments, and
documenting the evidence necessary to support their policy position such that
it will subsequently withstand judicial review. Such decision costs insulate
policies against regulator-initiated change but make ﬁrm-induced proposals
more likely. We argue further, however, that regulators are not homogenous
in the degree of asymmetric information but vary in their knowledge about
regulatedﬁrms.Knowledgegainedtacitlythroughpriorregulatoryexperience,
directly from other agencies public rulings, or from organized interest groups
can all reduce information asymmetries—thereby, all else equal, facilitating
regulatory policy making and/or deterring ﬁrms proposals for change.
We ﬁnd support for our hypotheses in an empirical analysis of the relation-
ship between regulatory informational environments and changes to regulated
rates for all investor-owned electric utilities during a 21-year period up to
2000. Regulatory agencies with more experienced commissioners, with larger
staffs, and with the ability to observe other agencies related rate rulings on the
same utility all tended to implement more frequent rate reductions. Similarly,
our results suggest that utilities behave strategically in their decisions to ini-
tiate policy reviews: they were signiﬁcantly less likely to request and obtain
rate increases in environments where regulatory agencies were arguably better
informed, notably those agencies with more experienced commissioners and
30 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationwhen there was publicly available evidence from other agencies of asset mis-
management. As agency commissioners gain experience with time then, they
tend to implement rate policies that increasingly favor consumer interests.
One interpretation of these empirical ﬁndings may be that they simply re-
ﬂect an increasing ability of consumer interests to capture agencies over time,
rather than the effect of diminishing information asymmetries on agency deci-
sions. We incorporate a variety of measures of consumer organization to con-
trol for such inﬂuences on regulatory decisions. Indeed, our results provide
new evidence on the ability of organized consumer groups to affect policy
outcomes. Consistent with the Stigler-Peltzman prediction, we ﬁnd that orga-
nizedconsumergroupsdoappeartohaveaninﬂuenceonregulatordecisionsto
change regulated rates but primarily in situations where utilities may initiate
requests for rate increases. Agencies are less likely to grant rate increases,
which would occur following a utility request, in states with more organized
consumer representation. By contrast, consumers appear generally less suc-
cessful in themselves initiating favorable policy changes (speciﬁcally rate
reductions) in regulatory forums, with the exception of industrial consumers.
Consumer groups thus have an uneven impact on the direction of rate changes.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that regulatory agencies are sensitive to political pressures
originating in the legislature, primarily in their decisions to increase, rather
than to decrease, utility rates. Consequently, utilities are somewhat insulated
against consumer and political adversaries as long as they do not ‘‘open the
gates’’ to the opposition by requesting a rate increase.
Thispatternofinterestgroupinﬂuenceisconsistentwithourargumentthat
information asymmetries between utilities and other parties present a consid-
erable hurdle for consumer and other groups wishing to effect rate reduc-
tions: obtaining evidence of utility overearnings—w h i c hc o u l dm o t i v a t e
the PUC to implement a full rate review—is extremely costly. Instead, these
groups exert their effect primarily through participating in reviews that con-
sider utility requests for rate increases, during which utilities themselves re-
duceinformationasymmetriesbypubliclyprovidingtheevidentiarybasisfor
their case. We also ﬁnd some evidence, through our inclusion of interaction
terms, that more organized consumer groups have less inﬂuence on the rate
decisions of more experienced PUCs. Even though our analysis is only pre-
liminary, further exploring the regulatory conditions under which organized
interest groups shape policy decisions is likely to be a fruitful area for future
research.
Our analysis contributes to two established streams of research. First, we
provide some of the ﬁrst empirical evidence in a large theoretical literature
on the impact of information asymmetries on policy making. Whereas the ma-
jority of existing research focuses on developing normative prescriptions for
optimal regulatory mechanisms, our analysis adopts a positive approach that is
susceptible to empirical testing. Although we are not able to directly observe
the extent of asymmetric information between regulators and ﬁrms, we have
identiﬁed some observable sources of information, such as prior experience,
which we argueare likely tobecorrelatedwith regulatorsinformationsetsand
Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs 31which we can leverage in our research design. As far as we know, this is the
ﬁrst study to adopt such a measurement strategy in the regulation literature.
Our second central contribution is to the long-standing debate on industry
capture of regulatory institutions and how this evolves dynamically (Stigler
1971; Dal Bo 2006). Early theorists argued that, over time, regulatory agencies
would become more dependent on industry for support, advice, and informa-
tion and that the initial enthusiasm for publicly interested regulation would
gradually wane (Bernstein 1955). Martimort (1999) formalized this approach
more recently in a dynamic principal-agent model of the interactions between
a regulated ﬁrm, an agency, and a political principal. Due to the repeated inter-
actions between the regulator and the ﬁrm, and the continuous ﬂow of infor-
mation over time, the regulator gains new opportunities to extract rents from
the ﬁrm, which in turn creates an incentive for the ﬁrm to collude with the
regulator. In this sense, the regulator becomes captured by the industry since
he hides information from the political principal and uses his discretion to ob-
tain bribes or other rewards from the industry (such as future employment),
leaving informational rents with the ﬁrm. Unfortunately, however, as one
survey of the capture literature comments, ‘‘empirical evidence on the causes
and consequences of capture is scarce ...there is virtually no evidence of how
(or whether) asymmetric information fosters regulatory capture’’ (Dal Bo
2006: 214).
Unlike the predictions of Bernstein and Martimort, we ﬁnd that more ex-
perienced commissions (one proxy for asymmetric information) tend to im-
plement more pro-consumer policies, speciﬁcally in the form of more
frequent rate reductions and fewer rate increases. Larger agencies are similarly
more likely to reduce utility rates. Further investigation is needed here, how-
ever. For instance, our measure of commission knowledge, based on the av-
erage of individual commissioners time in ofﬁce, is relatively crude. Future
reﬁnementscouldconsiderthedistributionofexperiencewithinacommission,
allowing for the ability of inexperienced commissioners to learn from those
with greater experience. Time inofﬁce isalso onlyaroughproxy for the extent
of information ﬂows between a utility and regulatory commissioners. Institu-
tional knowledge is additionally likely to exist within agency personnel, for
instance executive directors. Nonetheless, although only preliminary and con-
ﬁned to a single sector, these ﬁndings suggest that reduced information asym-
metries lower the ability of industry to capture regulatory policy.
The impact of interest rate changes on utility rates is also consistent with the
dynamic pattern of PUC pro-consumer decision making. As interest rates de-
cline since a utility’s last rate review, the probability of the PUC instituting
a rate reduction through a rate review increases. PUCs thus do not ‘‘sit on their
hands’’ while ﬁnancing costs fall, enabling utilities to earn an unrestricted rate
of return, but instead impose a ceiling. Again, this ﬁnding contrasts with prior
claims that PUCs effectively operate in utility interests during periods of cost
deﬂation by not implementing rate reductions through rate reviews. Joskow
argued that during the 1970s, ‘‘[Electricity] Firms ... have been permitted
to earn virtually any rate of return that they can.... This regulatory process
32 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationis therefore extremely passive’’ (1974: 298). Since the 1980s, however, PUCs
have initiated a substantial number of rate reductions. Indeed, during each year
from1996to2000thereweremoreratereviewsthatresultedinreductionsthan
in increases (see Table 1).
Even so, utilities beneﬁt from a lower responsiveness of PUC policy making
to exogenous cost reductions than to cost increases. When interest rates in-
crease by 2.4 percentage points since the utility’s last rate review (representing
one standard deviation from the sample mean), the probability of the utility
achieving a rate increase increases by 4.8% points (see Table 4). When interest
ratesfallbythesameamount,however,theprobabilityofaPUCimplementing
a rate decrease increases by only 3.7% points. Utilities thus appear quick to
request rate relief after costs rise, whereas PUCs are slower to cut rates after
costs decrease. Such asymmetric behavior need not reﬂect industry capture of
regulatory agencies. Rate reviews tend to be resource-intensive administrative
processes; PUCs, which operate under ﬁxed budgets (determined through the
political budgeting process), simply may not have the available resources to
undertake additional rate reviews even if they suspect that utility costs have
fallen.
One corollary is that true utility earned rates of return should depend in part
on whether uncontrollable costs are rising or falling. During periods of exog-
enous cost increases—such as due to fuel price changes or unusual weather
patterns that affect electricity demand—utilities are exposed to downward
pressure on rates of return from opposition political and interest groups when
they initiate compensatory rate increase requests. On the other hand, when
costs fall, utilities are protected from these downward pressures since they
do not have an incentive to voluntarily initiate rate-reducing reviews. Actual
earned rates of return should then be higher during periods of cost deﬂation
than cost inﬂation, all else equal. We leave this avenue of research for the
future.
Naturally, there are a variety of limitations in our analysis that should
lead to some caution in interpreting the results. First, although we argue
that asymmetric information affects policy outcomes by raising regulatory
decision costs, we are not able to observe such costs in this study. Further
research could develop appropriate measures and directly test the hypoth-
esized relationship. Second, we have excluded the role of the courts from
our analysis of policy-making institutions. Some scholars have argued that
strategic interactions between agencies and courts may lead agencies to de-
liberately manipulate the extent of their decision costs (through their choice
of policy-making instruments) in order to insulate rulings from future
judicial override (Tiller and Spiller 1999). Incorporating an additional
institutional actor, however, is beyond the scope and objectives of this
study and would likely not alter our central insights. Again, this provides
an avenue for future development. Despite these and other limitations, our
analysis takes a step toward a more comprehensive understanding from
a positive theoretical approach of the impact of information asymmetries
on regulatory policy making.
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